Glachant, M. (2007). Non-binding voluntary agreements. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 54 (1), 32-48. This could create a misperception between AA participation and environmental performance. Nevertheless, as explained below, we conclude that the four AVs in our sample had few additional environmental benefits, i.e. benefits that would not have occurred without A.A. participation. It is therefore unlikely that our conclusions were distorted by selection effects.
Nevertheless, we have tried to control such effects by asking our respondents to assess only the additional benefits of AVs, by not carefully eliminating the additional benefits in our evaluation, and by explicitly identifying cases where selection effects could have been significant (for example. B in the sections “Antioquia Cut Flower Sector” and “Palm Oil Sector”). Croci, E. (note). The Manual of Voluntary Environmental Agreements. Dordrecht: Springer. Koehler, D. (2008). The effectiveness of voluntary environmental programs – A policy at a crossroads? Policy Studies Journal, 35 (4), 689-722. De Clercq, M., Bracke, R. (2005).
On the evaluation of voluntary environmental agreements in Europe. In E. Croci (Ed.), The Manual of Voluntary Environmental Agreements (p. 335-363). Dordrecht: Springer. Although several evaluations of Colombian VAs were commissioned by the country`s Ministry of the Environment, these were primarily aimed at answering short-term questions (e.g.B. if and how to renegotiate specific agreements) for domestic policy makers, not the broader issues discussed below. See Esterling Lara (2002), MAVDT (2003, 2006) and MAVDT/IDEAM (2005). Esterling Lara, A. (2002). Evaluacion y Perspectivas de los Convenios de Concertacién para una Produccién mes Limpia en Colombia.
Aplicacién de un Modelo de Evaluacion Estratégica a los Convenios de Concertacion [Assessment and outlook of Colombian agreements on own production]. Final report to MMA. Bogota. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2003) Voluntary approaches to environmental policy: effectiveness, efficiency and use in policy dosages. Paris: OECD Environment Directorate. Fedededenische Nacional de Cultivadores de Palma de Aceite (FEDEPALMA). (1997). Convenio de Concertacién para una Produccién Limpia con de Subsector de Palma de Aceite [Clean production agreement with the palm oil subsector]. Bogota. Interest in the use of voluntary agreements (VAs) as an environmental policy instrument has increased. This article uses a simple model to determine whether AVs are likely to lead to effective environmental protection.
We look at cases where polluters are required to participate either through a substantive threat of mandatory controls (the “stick” approach) or by cost-shared subsidies (the carrot approach).